Does the Terraform code for a CloudFront-fronted API Gateway meet five written requirements?
Plan, reviewed by the architect expert on codex, gemini, grok, or:kimi-k3 and or:glm-5-3.
unresolved after 1 round
Recovered from the logs of a run on 2026-09-05 on Deliberation 3.14.5, tool consensus-step. Reviewer text is verbatim, so it can disagree with itself and with the verdict line the engine read.
The prompt
Question
Review a Terraform plan against the written requirements it claims to satisfy. Three lenses, all required: (a) Architect - is the design sound; (b) Security Analyst - does it hold up under attack; (c) Plan Reviewer - does it actually satisfy every numbered requirement 1..5.
Sent to every reviewer
Full text, verbatim (11,512 characters)
Review a Terraform plan against the written requirements it claims to satisfy. Three lenses, all required: (a) Architect - is the design sound; (b) Security Analyst - does it hold up under attack; (c) Plan Reviewer - does it actually satisfy every numbered requirement 1..5.
Repo root: [redacted: local path]/demo
Files under review: case1-cloudfront/main.tf, outputs.tf, variables.tf, versions.tf, .checkov.yml
Requirements: requirements/case1.md
Note: nothing is applied. This is plan-level reasoning only. Scanner status is already known and is NOT the question: `terraform validate`, `tflint`, `trivy` and `checkov` are all green on this root (checkov: 63 passed, 0 failed, with three graph-solver skips in .checkov.yml, each with a written reason). The question is whether the code satisfies the REQUIREMENTS, which no scanner ever reads.
=== THE REQUIREMENTS (requirements/case1.md), verbatim ===
# Requirements - public order lookup API
We are exposing the order lookup endpoint to our mobile app.
## Requirements
1. No public access to the API itself. Everything reaches it through
CloudFront.
2. CloudFront must have a WAF attached with a rate limit.
3. Requests must be authenticated (IAM auth is fine for now).
4. Access logs retained for a year, encrypted with a customer-managed key.
5. Serve only to our launch markets: PL, NO, SE, DK, DE.
## Out of scope
Custom domain and ACM certificate - we ship on the default CloudFront
certificate for this milestone.
=== THE PLAN (case1-cloudfront/main.tf), verbatim except where marked ===
resource "aws_api_gateway_rest_api" "this" {
name = "${var.name}-api"
description = "Internal API. The requirements say it must only be reachable through CloudFront."
lifecycle { create_before_destroy = true }
}
resource "aws_api_gateway_client_certificate" "this" {
description = "Lets the origin verify calls came from API Gateway."
}
resource "aws_api_gateway_request_validator" "this" {
name = "${var.name}-validator"
rest_api_id = aws_api_gateway_rest_api.this.id
validate_request_body = true
validate_request_parameters = true
}
resource "aws_api_gateway_method_settings" "prod" {
rest_api_id = aws_api_gateway_rest_api.this.id
stage_name = aws_api_gateway_stage.prod.stage_name
method_path = "*/*"
settings {
logging_level = "ERROR"
metrics_enabled = true
caching_enabled = true
cache_data_encrypted = true
}
}
resource "aws_api_gateway_resource" "orders" {
rest_api_id = aws_api_gateway_rest_api.this.id
parent_id = aws_api_gateway_rest_api.this.root_resource_id
path_part = "orders"
}
resource "aws_api_gateway_method" "get_orders" {
rest_api_id = aws_api_gateway_rest_api.this.id
resource_id = aws_api_gateway_resource.orders.id
http_method = "GET"
authorization = "AWS_IAM"
request_validator_id = aws_api_gateway_request_validator.this.id
}
resource "aws_api_gateway_integration" "get_orders" {
rest_api_id = aws_api_gateway_rest_api.this.id
resource_id = aws_api_gateway_resource.orders.id
http_method = aws_api_gateway_method.get_orders.http_method
type = "MOCK"
request_templates = { "application/json" = "{\"statusCode\": 200}" }
}
resource "aws_api_gateway_deployment" "this" {
rest_api_id = aws_api_gateway_rest_api.this.id
depends_on = [aws_api_gateway_integration.get_orders]
lifecycle { create_before_destroy = true }
}
resource "aws_api_gateway_stage" "prod" {
deployment_id = aws_api_gateway_deployment.this.id
rest_api_id = aws_api_gateway_rest_api.this.id
stage_name = "prod"
xray_tracing_enabled = true
cache_cluster_enabled = true
cache_cluster_size = "0.5"
client_certificate_id = aws_api_gateway_client_certificate.this.id
access_log_settings {
destination_arn = aws_cloudwatch_log_group.api.arn
format = "{\"requestId\":\"$context.requestId\",\"ip\":\"$context.identity.sourceIp\"}"
}
}
resource "aws_cloudwatch_log_group" "api" {
name = "/aws/apigateway/${var.name}"
retention_in_days = 365
kms_key_id = aws_kms_key.logs.arn
}
resource "aws_kms_key" "logs" {
description = "CMK for ${var.name} API access logs"
enable_key_rotation = true
deletion_window_in_days = 30
}
# --- the edge the requirements asked for ---
resource "aws_wafv2_web_acl" "edge" {
provider = aws.us_east_1
name = "${var.name}-edge"
scope = "CLOUDFRONT"
default_action { allow {} }
rule {
name = "log4j"
priority = 0
override_action { none {} }
statement {
managed_rule_group_statement {
name = "AWSManagedRulesKnownBadInputsRuleSet"
vendor_name = "AWS"
}
}
visibility_config { cloudwatch_metrics_enabled = true, metric_name = "${var.name}-edge-log4j", sampled_requests_enabled = true }
}
rule {
name = "rate-limit"
priority = 1
action { block {} }
statement { rate_based_statement { limit = 2000, aggregate_key_type = "IP" } }
visibility_config { cloudwatch_metrics_enabled = true, metric_name = "${var.name}-rate-limit", sampled_requests_enabled = true }
}
visibility_config { cloudwatch_metrics_enabled = true, metric_name = "${var.name}-edge", sampled_requests_enabled = true }
}
resource "aws_cloudfront_distribution" "this" {
enabled = true
comment = "${var.name} edge"
web_acl_id = aws_wafv2_web_acl.edge.arn
price_class = "PriceClass_100"
is_ipv6_enabled = true
origin {
domain_name = "${aws_api_gateway_rest_api.this.id}.execute-api.${var.region}.amazonaws.com"
origin_id = "apigw"
origin_path = "/${aws_api_gateway_stage.prod.stage_name}"
custom_origin_config {
http_port = 80
https_port = 443
origin_protocol_policy = "https-only"
origin_ssl_protocols = ["TLSv1.2"]
}
}
default_cache_behavior {
target_origin_id = "apigw"
response_headers_policy_id = data.aws_cloudfront_response_headers_policy.security.id
viewer_protocol_policy = "redirect-to-https"
allowed_methods = ["GET", "HEAD"]
cached_methods = ["GET", "HEAD"]
forwarded_values {
query_string = true
headers = ["Authorization"]
cookies { forward = "none" }
}
# Authorization is per-caller (SigV4), so caching is disabled outright.
min_ttl = 0
default_ttl = 0
max_ttl = 0
}
logging_config {
bucket = aws_s3_bucket.logs.bucket_domain_name
prefix = "cloudfront/"
include_cookies = false
}
restrictions {
geo_restriction {
restriction_type = "whitelist"
locations = ["PL", "NO", "SE", "DK", "DE"]
}
}
viewer_certificate {
cloudfront_default_certificate = true
minimum_protocol_version = "TLSv1.2_2021"
}
}
# --- log sink for the edge ---
# aws_s3_bucket.logs (bucket_prefix "${var.name}-logs-"), plus:
# ownership_controls = BucketOwnerEnforced
# sse configuration = aws:kms with kms_master_key_id = aws_kms_key.logs.arn
# versioning = Enabled
# bucket logging = self, prefix "access/"
# public_access_block = all four flags true
# lifecycle = expire after 365 days, abort incomplete MPU after 7
# --- the scanner's own recommendation, applied ---
# Checkov CKV2_AWS_29 wants a WAF in front of the API Gateway stage. Here it is.
resource "aws_wafv2_web_acl" "api" {
name = "${var.name}-api"
scope = "REGIONAL"
default_action { allow {} }
rule {
name = "log4j"
priority = 1
override_action { none {} }
statement {
managed_rule_group_statement {
name = "AWSManagedRulesKnownBadInputsRuleSet"
vendor_name = "AWS"
}
}
visibility_config { cloudwatch_metrics_enabled = true, metric_name = "${var.name}-api-log4j", sampled_requests_enabled = true }
}
visibility_config { cloudwatch_metrics_enabled = true, metric_name = "${var.name}-api", sampled_requests_enabled = true }
}
resource "aws_wafv2_web_acl_association" "api" {
resource_arn = aws_api_gateway_stage.prod.arn
web_acl_arn = aws_wafv2_web_acl.api.arn
}
resource "aws_wafv2_web_acl_logging_configuration" "api" {
resource_arn = aws_wafv2_web_acl.api.arn
log_destination_configs = [aws_cloudwatch_log_group.waf_api.arn]
}
resource "aws_cloudwatch_log_group" "waf_api" {
name = "aws-waf-logs-${var.name}-api"
retention_in_days = 365
kms_key_id = aws_kms_key.logs.arn
}
data "aws_cloudfront_response_headers_policy" "security" { name = "Managed-SecurityHeadersPolicy" }
data "aws_caller_identity" "current" {}
resource "aws_kms_key_policy" "logs" {
key_id = aws_kms_key.logs.id
policy = jsonencode({
Version = "2012-10-17"
Statement = [{
Sid = "AllowAccountAdmin"
Effect = "Allow"
Principal = { AWS = "[redacted: account root ARN]" }
Action = "kms:*"
Resource = "*"
}]
})
}
# WAF edge logging: aws_wafv2_web_acl_logging_configuration.edge (us-east-1) ->
# aws_cloudwatch_log_group.waf_edge (us-east-1, 365 days, encrypted with a
# second CMK aws_kms_key.logs_us_east_1, also in us-east-1, with the same
# account-root key policy). CLOUDFRONT-scope WAF logging requires the log group
# in us-east-1, and CloudWatch Logs requires the key in the same region as the
# group, hence the second key.
=== FULL RESOURCE INVENTORY (nothing omitted) ===
aws_api_gateway_rest_api.this, aws_api_gateway_client_certificate.this,
aws_api_gateway_request_validator.this, aws_api_gateway_method_settings.prod,
aws_api_gateway_resource.orders, aws_api_gateway_method.get_orders,
aws_api_gateway_integration.get_orders, aws_api_gateway_deployment.this,
aws_api_gateway_stage.prod, aws_cloudwatch_log_group.api, aws_kms_key.logs,
aws_kms_key_policy.logs, aws_wafv2_web_acl.edge, aws_cloudfront_distribution.this,
aws_s3_bucket.logs (+ownership_controls, +sse, +versioning, +logging,
+public_access_block, +lifecycle_configuration), aws_wafv2_web_acl.api,
aws_wafv2_web_acl_association.api, aws_wafv2_web_acl_logging_configuration.api,
aws_cloudwatch_log_group.waf_api, aws_wafv2_web_acl_logging_configuration.edge,
aws_cloudwatch_log_group.waf_edge, aws_kms_key.logs_us_east_1,
aws_kms_key_policy.logs_us_east_1, data.aws_cloudfront_response_headers_policy.security,
data.aws_caller_identity.current.
There is NO aws_api_gateway_rest_api_policy resource in this root. There is no
custom origin header on the CloudFront origin block. There is no VPC endpoint and
the REST API has no endpoint_configuration block (so it defaults to EDGE).
outputs.tf exposes both `cloudfront_url` (https://<dist>/orders) and
`execute_api_url` (https://<rest_api_id>.execute-api.<region>.amazonaws.com/prod/orders).
variables.tf: `name` (string, default "case1"), `region` (string, default "eu-west-1").
versions.tf: aws provider ~> 6.0, with a second aliased provider `aws.us_east_1`.
=== WHAT TO ANSWER ===
For each numbered requirement 1..5, state SATISFIED or NOT SATISFIED and name the
exact resource (or the exact missing resource) that decides it. Then give the
architecture and attack-surface assessment. Be concrete about the mechanism, not
just the label - if you claim something is reachable or bypassable, say by what
request path, and say what the correct binding resource would be.Round history
| Round | Blind verdict | Reviewers | After adjudication | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Round 1 9m 35s | NOT RECORDED | codex REQUEST CHANGES[5]gemini REQUEST CHANGES[6]grok REQUEST CHANGES[5]or:kimi-k3 REQUEST CHANGES[10]or:glm-5-3 REQUEST CHANGES[6] | REJECT 21 accepted | Not converged, 0 of 5 approved |
Round 1
Blind verdict. NOT RECORDED The host agent's blind verdict for this round was not kept.
codex REQUEST CHANGES
REQUEST_CHANGES. Requirements 2 and 3 are satisfied; 1, 4, and 5 are not. The largest risk is the public execute-api path bypassing CloudFront rate and geography controls. Logging is also nonfunctional because legacy CloudFront logging conflicts with BucketOwnerEnforced and the KMS/API Gateway delivery permissions are incomplete. Effort: Medium. Confidence: High.
Full response, verbatim
## Essential **Bottom line:** Only requirements 2 and 3 are satisfied. The public `execute-api` route bypasses CloudFront’s rate limit and country restriction, while the access-log configuration has multiple delivery blockers; this needs changes before approval. ### Requirements 1–5 1. **NOT SATISFIED — API accessible only through CloudFront.** [`aws_api_gateway_rest_api.this`]([redacted: local path]/demo/case1-cloudfront/main.tf:9) does not set `disable_execute_api_endpoint`, an endpoint policy, or a private endpoint. Because no `endpoint_configuration` is specified, this REST API defaults to `EDGE`, and the direct route remains: `GET https://<rest-api-id>.execute-api.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/prod/orders` That route is explicitly published by [`output.execute_api_url`]([redacted: local path]/demo/case1-cloudfront/outputs.tf:6). API Gateway REST APIs default to edge-optimized public endpoints, and disabling the default endpoint is the native way to prevent invocation through it. [AWS endpoint-type documentation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/apigateway/latest/developerguide/api-gateway-api-endpoint-types.html), [Terraform resource documentation](https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/aws/latest/docs/resources/api_gateway_rest_api). The correct binding depends on the intended meaning: - For “direct requests must be rejected,” add an origin secret through `aws_cloudfront_distribution.this.origin.custom_header`, then add a high-priority block-on-missing-or-wrong-header rule to `aws_wafv2_web_acl.api`. AWS documents this custom-header mechanism specifically for preventing direct origin access. [CloudFront custom-origin headers](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/add-origin-custom-headers.html) - For “the API must not expose a usable public AWS endpoint,” set `disable_execute_api_endpoint = true` and use an `aws_api_gateway_domain_name` plus API mapping as the CloudFront origin. That requires revisiting the stated custom-domain/ACM exclusion. - A missing `aws_api_gateway_rest_api_policy` is a defense-in-depth gap, but it cannot by itself prove traversal through CloudFront: supported policy boundaries are principals, IP ranges, VPCs, and VPC endpoints—not a CloudFront distribution identity. [API Gateway resource policies](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/apigateway/latest/developerguide/apigateway-resource-policies.html) 2. **SATISFIED — CloudFront WAF with rate limit.** [`aws_cloudfront_distribution.this.web_acl_id`]([redacted: local path]/demo/case1-cloudfront/main.tf:166) attaches `aws_wafv2_web_acl.edge`, whose `rate-limit` rule blocks after 2,000 requests per IP. This satisfies the requirement narrowly, although direct API traffic bypasses it. 3. **SATISFIED — Authentication required.** [`aws_api_gateway_method.get_orders.authorization`]([redacted: local path]/demo/case1-cloudfront/main.tf:48) is `AWS_IAM`, so unsigned or unauthorized requests cannot invoke the method. IAM-authenticated API calls require SigV4 and `execute-api:Invoke` permission. [API Gateway IAM authorization](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/apigateway/latest/developerguide/api-gateway-control-access-using-iam-policies-to-invoke-api.html) The mobile integration remains incomplete: no caller role, invoke policy, or credential-delivery mechanism is defined. With the default CloudFront domain, the client must sign using the API Gateway origin host while sending the request to the CloudFront endpoint; signing the CloudFront hostname normally produces a signature mismatch. [AWS CloudFront/API Gateway setup guidance](https://repost.aws/knowledge-center/api-gateway-cloudfront-distribution) 4. **NOT SATISFIED — One-year CMK-encrypted access logs.** Retention and CMK references are declared, but delivery is not viable: - [`aws_cloudfront_distribution.this.logging_config`]([redacted: local path]/demo/case1-cloudfront/main.tf:210) uses legacy CloudFront logging. Its destination has `BucketOwnerEnforced`, which disables the ACLs legacy logging requires; AWS says this combination prevents delivery and can make distribution creation fail. [CloudFront legacy logging requirements](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/standard-logging-legacy-s3.html) - [`aws_kms_key_policy.logs`]([redacted: local path]/demo/case1-cloudfront/main.tf:346) grants only account root. It lacks permissions for `delivery.logs.amazonaws.com` and `logs.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com`. The us-east-1 policy similarly lacks `logs.us-east-1.amazonaws.com`. CloudWatch Logs requires its regional service principal in the KMS policy. [CloudWatch Logs KMS requirements](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudWatch/latest/logs/encrypt-log-data-kms.html) - No `aws_api_gateway_account` and associated IAM role set `cloudwatch_role_arn`. Unless that account-wide setting already exists outside this root, API Gateway cannot publish execution/access logs. [API Gateway logging permissions](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/apigateway/latest/developerguide/set-up-logging.html) - `aws_s3_bucket_logging.logs` targets the same bucket and has no compatible delivery policy. If made functional, self-logging also risks recursive log generation. 5. **NOT SATISFIED — Only PL, NO, SE, DK, DE served.** [`aws_cloudfront_distribution.this.restrictions`]([redacted: local path]/demo/case1-cloudfront/main.tf:216) correctly whitelists those countries, but this applies only to CloudFront viewers. An IAM-authorized request from another country can call the direct `execute-api` URL; `aws_wafv2_web_acl.api` contains neither a geo rule nor an origin-binding rule. ## Architecture and attack surface | Request path | Controls applied | Controls bypassed | |---|---|---| | `https://<distribution>/orders` | CloudFront WAF, 2,000/IP rate limit, country whitelist, regional WAF, IAM | None intended | | `https://<api-id>.execute-api.../prod/orders` | Regional KnownBadInputs WAF, IAM | CloudFront WAF, edge rate limit, country whitelist | This is not an anonymous order-data bypass—`AWS_IAM` still rejects unauthorized callers. It is nevertheless a meaningful policy and availability bypass: authorized users, stolen credentials, bots sending invalid signatures, and distributed traffic can reach API Gateway without the required edge controls. Additional findings: - **Architecture:** A default edge-optimized API behind a separately managed CloudFront distribution creates two edge layers. Set the API endpoint type explicitly to `REGIONAL` when retaining the custom distribution. - **Correctness:** `aws_api_gateway_client_certificate.this` is irrelevant to CloudFront-to-API authentication. API Gateway presents that certificate outbound to an HTTPS backend; the integration is currently `MOCK`. [API Gateway client-certificate purpose](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/apigateway/latest/developerguide/getting-started-client-side-ssl-authentication.html) - **Correctness/scope:** The `MOCK` integration does not look up orders, and no method or integration response resources exist. The resulting API is not a functional order-lookup implementation. - **Security/performance:** CloudFront caching is disabled, but API Gateway caching is enabled globally with no caller or order cache key. Once a real backend returns customer-specific data, one authorized caller’s response could be reused for another cache-equivalent request. Disable it until explicit cache-key isolation exists. [API Gateway caching and cache keys](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/apigateway/latest/developerguide/api-gateway-caching.html) - **Operations:** `aws_api_gateway_deployment.this` has no trigger hash. Later method, model, or integration edits may not produce a new deployment snapshot. - **Ambiguity:** “No public access” must distinguish public network reachability from rejection of direct requests. “Launch market” currently means source-IP geolocation, which does not establish customer residency and is bypassable through VPNs. ### Security checklist | Category | Status | |---|---| | Injection | Insufficient context: current backend is a mock; one managed WAF group is not backend validation | | Broken authentication | Secure at the method; mobile credential provisioning is unspecified | | Sensitive data | Vulnerable when a real backend is added unless API Gateway caching is partitioned or disabled | | XXE | Not applicable to the current mock | | Broken access control | Vulnerable: direct endpoint bypasses required path and geography controls | | Security misconfiguration | Vulnerable: incompatible logging, ineffective client certificate, implicit edge endpoint | | XSS | Not applicable to the current mock | | Insecure deserialization | Not applicable to the current mock | | Vulnerable components | Known scanners are green; provider constraint still permits unreviewed major upgrades | | Logging failures | Vulnerable: several log-delivery prerequisites are missing | **Risk rating:** HIGH. ## Action plan 1. Define requirement 1 precisely. For strict endpoint removal, reopen the custom-domain/ACM scope; otherwise document that origin-secret validation is the accepted milestone control. 2. Set API Gateway explicitly to `REGIONAL`, then implement CloudFront custom-header plus regional-WAF rejection of missing or incorrect values. Add an API resource policy for permitted IAM principals, but do not treat it as CloudFront provenance. 3. Keep `AWS_IAM`, define the mobile credential source and least-privilege `execute-api:Invoke` policy, and document the special SigV4 host/endpoint behavior. 4. Replace legacy CloudFront logging with standard logging v2 using `aws_cloudwatch_log_delivery_source`, `aws_cloudwatch_log_delivery_destination`, and `aws_cloudwatch_log_delivery`; add the required S3 and KMS service-principal policies. 5. Add or explicitly document the account-level API Gateway CloudWatch role, and grant both regional CloudWatch Logs principals scoped KMS access. 6. Disable API Gateway caching until caller/order-specific cache keys are designed; replace the mock with the intended backend and response mappings. 7. Add plan assertions and post-deployment acceptance tests: direct endpoint rejected, unsigned CloudFront rejected, outside-market CloudFront rejected, allowed-market signed request succeeds, and every log sink receives decryptable events. **Effort:** Medium (1–2 days), assuming the order backend and mobile identity system already exist. **Confidence:** High; findings are grounded in the inspected files and documented AWS service behavior. ### Terraform execution assumptions The actual root specifies Terraform `>= 1.5` and AWS provider `>= 5.0`, while the lock file selects AWS `6.63.0`; local Terraform is `1.15.2`. There is no backend block, so an apply would use local state unless the execution environment injects a backend. Execution path and environment criticality were not provided; I treated this as launch-production infrastructure. Risk categories addressed: conformance gaps, testing blind spots, provider-upgrade risk, and state-corruption risk. No state was mutated, so there is nothing to roll back. Any eventual apply should use a retained, reviewed plan artifact; disabling the default endpoint must be rolled out only after the replacement origin route is proven. Suggested verification sequence: ```bash terraform fmt -check -recursive terraform init -backend=false terraform validate tflint trivy config . checkov -d . terraform plan -out=tfplan terraform show -json tfplan > tfplan.json ``` Static success is insufficient: the five request-path and log-delivery acceptance tests above remain mandatory. <SUMMARY>REQUEST_CHANGES. Requirements 2 and 3 are satisfied; 1, 4, and 5 are not. The largest risk is the public execute-api path bypassing CloudFront rate and geography controls. Logging is also nonfunctional because legacy CloudFront logging conflicts with BucketOwnerEnforced and the KMS/API Gateway delivery permissions are incomplete. Effort: Medium. Confidence: High.</SUMMARY> VERDICT: REQUEST_CHANGES - [security] The public execute-api endpoint bypasses the mandatory CloudFront WAF rate limit and launch-market restriction. - [correctness] Legacy CloudFront logging is incompatible with BucketOwnerEnforced, while the KMS policies and API Gateway logging role do not permit reliable log delivery. - [correctness] The API uses a MOCK integration with no response mappings and does not implement an order lookup. - [security] API Gateway caching is shared without caller or order cache keys, creating a cross-caller data-exposure risk when the real integration is added. - [ambiguity] Strict removal of public API access requires a custom API Gateway domain after disabling execute-api, contradicting the current custom-domain/ACM exclusion.
gemini REQUEST CHANGES
The plan fails Requirements 1 and 4, and contains runtime defects breaking Requirement 3. API Gateway lacks a resource policy to prevent direct public access bypassing CloudFront and WAF. KMS key policies lack CloudWatch Logs service principal permissions, and CloudFront standard access logging fails against SSE-KMS S3 buckets. SigV4 header forwarding and canonical paths are misconfigured. Effort: Short (1–4h). Confidence: High. Top risk: CloudFront and edge WAF/geo-controls are completely bypassed by querying the public execute-api endpoint directly.
Full response, verbatim
## Essential ### Bottom Line The Terraform plan fails two of the five requirements (Req 1 and Req 4) and contains critical integration defects in Req 3 that will break AWS SigV4 authentication at runtime. While individual resources pass static linting, the design lacks origin lockdown on API Gateway, has broken KMS key policies for CloudWatch Logs, and uses incompatible S3 SSE-KMS encryption for CloudFront standard access logs. ### Action Plan 1. **Lock down API Gateway**: Configure `aws_api_gateway_rest_api.this` as `REGIONAL` and attach an `aws_api_gateway_rest_api_policy` that denies requests lacking a secret custom header injected by CloudFront origin custom headers. 2. **Fix KMS Key Policies**: Update `aws_kms_key_policy.logs` and `aws_kms_key_policy.logs_us_east_1` to grant `kms:Encrypt*`, `kms:Decrypt*`, `kms:ReEncrypt*`, `kms:GenerateDataKey*`, and `kms:Describe*` to the `logs.${var.region}.amazonaws.com` service principal. 3. **Fix CloudFront Access Log Encryption**: Reconfigure `aws_s3_bucket.logs` SSE to use `AES256` (SSE-S3) or switch to CloudFront Real-time Logs via Kinesis, as CloudFront standard access log delivery cannot write to SSE-KMS buckets. 4. **Fix SigV4 Header & Path Forwarding**: In `aws_cloudfront_distribution.this`, forward all SigV4 headers (`x-amz-date`, `x-amz-security-token`, `x-amz-content-sha256`, `Authorization`) or use an Origin Request Policy, and ensure the canonical request path signed by clients matches the path evaluated by API Gateway. 5. **Decommission Unused Stage Cache Cluster**: Set `cache_cluster_enabled = false` in `aws_api_gateway_stage.prod` and remove `aws_api_gateway_client_certificate.this` to eliminate unnecessary recurring infrastructure cost. 6. **Remove Output Exposure**: Delete `execute_api_url` from `outputs.tf` to prevent accidental direct routing to the origin. - **Effort**: Short (1–4 hours) - **Confidence**: High --- ## Requirements Verification (Plan Reviewer Lens) | Requirement | Status | Deciding / Missing Resource | Root Cause / Mechanism | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **1. No public API access (CloudFront only)** | **NOT SATISFIED** | Missing `aws_api_gateway_rest_api_policy` (and missing `origin.custom_header` on `aws_cloudfront_distribution.this`) | `aws_api_gateway_rest_api.this` defaults to an open public `EDGE` endpoint. Without an API Gateway resource policy enforcing origin identity or secret headers, the API is directly accessible over the internet via `https://<api_id>.execute-api.<region>.amazonaws.com/prod/orders`. | | **2. CloudFront WAF with rate limit** | **SATISFIED** | `aws_wafv2_web_acl.edge` (and `aws_cloudfront_distribution.this.web_acl_id`) | Scope `CLOUDFRONT` WAF with rule `rate-limit` (priority 1, 2000 req/5min IP rate-based block) is associated with the distribution. | | **3. Authenticated requests (IAM auth)** | **SATISFIED** *(Declaratively)* / **BROKEN** *(In Transit)* | `aws_api_gateway_method.get_orders` | `authorization = "AWS_IAM"` is declared on the method. However, CloudFront's `forwarded_values` drops SigV4 headers (`x-amz-date`, `x-amz-security-token`) and `origin_path = "/prod"` alters the canonical URI path, causing SigV4 signature verification to fail when invoked via CloudFront. | | **4. 1-year access logs encrypted with CMK** | **NOT SATISFIED** | `aws_kms_key_policy.logs` & `aws_s3_bucket.logs` | (1) `aws_kms_key_policy.logs` permits only the AWS root account, blocking `logs.<region>.amazonaws.com` from encrypting CloudWatch logs. (2) Standard CloudFront access log delivery does not support destination S3 buckets encrypted with SSE-KMS CMKs, causing log delivery failure. | | **5. Geo-restriction (PL, NO, SE, DK, DE)** | **SATISFIED** | `aws_cloudfront_distribution.this` (`restrictions.geo_restriction`) | Whitelist restriction is configured with `["PL", "NO", "SE", "DK", "DE"]`. (Enforced at CloudFront edge, but bypassable if calling API Gateway directly due to Req 1 failure). | --- ## Deep Dive Lenses ### Lens A: Architect Assessment - **Nesting CloudFront on Edge API Gateway**: `aws_api_gateway_rest_api.this` defaults to `EDGE` (CloudFront-backed). Fronting an Edge API Gateway with `aws_cloudfront_distribution.this` creates a double-CloudFront hop, adding latency and hop overhead. It must be explicitly configured with `endpoint_configuration { types = ["REGIONAL"] }`. - **Misaligned Caching Tier**: `aws_api_gateway_stage.prod` provisions a dedicated `0.5GB` cache cluster (`cache_cluster_enabled = true`), but CloudFront sets `min_ttl = 0, default_ttl = 0, max_ttl = 0` due to per-caller IAM auth. Provisioning an API Gateway stage cache cluster adds recurring monthly cost while caching zero requests. - **Client Certificate Misconception**: `aws_api_gateway_client_certificate.this` generates a certificate for API Gateway to authenticate against an HTTP backend. It does not authenticate CloudFront to API Gateway. ### Lens B: Security Analyst Assessment - **CloudFront Bypass Vector**: - **Attack Path**: `GET https://<api-id>.execute-api.<region>.amazonaws.com/prod/orders` with valid SigV4 IAM credentials. - **Impact**: Attackers from non-launch regions (bypassing Req 5) send high-frequency requests (bypassing Req 2 WAF rate limiting) and leave no trace in CloudFront access logs. - **Remediation**: Add a secret header in CloudFront (`X-Origin-Verify`) and enforce it via `aws_api_gateway_rest_api_policy` with a `StringEquals` condition on `aws:Header/X-Origin-Verify` (or validate via regional WAF rule). - **Log Black Hole / Blind Spot**: - `aws_kms_key_policy.logs` and `logs_us_east_1` grant permissions exclusively to `[redacted: account root ARN]`. Because the CloudWatch Logs service principal (`logs.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com` and `logs.us-east-1.amazonaws.com`) is omitted, log group creation or stream ingestion fails silently or generates access denied errors, leaving no audit trail. --- ## Expanded ### Why This Approach 1. **Defense-in-depth isolation**: Setting API Gateway to `REGIONAL` paired with an explicit resource policy guarantees that edge protections (WAF, Geo-IP, logging) cannot be circumvented. 2. **Standard AWS SigV4 compatibility**: Forwarding necessary auth headers and aligning canonical path structures allows SigV4 verification to succeed without custom proxy workarounds. 3. **Operational observability**: Correcting KMS service principal policies ensures audit log retention and encryption conformance without broken delivery pipelines. 4. **Cost elimination**: Removing the unused API Gateway cache cluster saves operational expense without impacting latency. ### Risks & Mitigations - **Origin header disclosure**: If the `X-Origin-Verify` header secret leaks, direct API access is possible. *Mitigation*: Store the secret in Secrets Manager / SSM and rotate it periodically using Terraform or an automated rotation function. - **SigV4 Host header conflict**: Forwarding the client `Host` header to API Gateway causes TLS SNI / routing mismatches. *Mitigation*: Do not forward the `Host` header; forward only `Authorization`, `x-amz-date`, and `x-amz-security-token`. --- ## Edge Cases ### Escalation Triggers - If the mobile app requires dynamic public user authentication rather than IAM credentials, transition from IAM auth to Amazon Cognito User Pools or API Gateway JWT Authorizers. - If private VPC routing is required between CloudFront and backend compute, migrate from public API Gateway to Private API Gateway with VPC Endpoints or Application Load Balancers with AWS VPC Lattice. ### Alternative Sketch For tighter origin isolation without header secrets, place API Gateway in a VPC as a `PRIVATE` REST API accessed via a VPC Endpoint, fronted by an Application Load Balancer / Lambda reverse proxy or CloudFront Origin Facing VPC features. --- <SUMMARY> The plan fails Requirements 1 and 4, and contains runtime defects breaking Requirement 3. API Gateway lacks a resource policy to prevent direct public access bypassing CloudFront and WAF. KMS key policies lack CloudWatch Logs service principal permissions, and CloudFront standard access logging fails against SSE-KMS S3 buckets. SigV4 header forwarding and canonical paths are misconfigured. Effort: Short (1–4h). Confidence: High. Top risk: CloudFront and edge WAF/geo-controls are completely bypassed by querying the public execute-api endpoint directly. </SUMMARY> VERDICT: REQUEST_CHANGES - [security] Direct internet access to API Gateway execute-api domain is open without a resource policy or secret header, bypassing CloudFront Geo-restrictions, WAF rate limits, and access logging. - [security] aws_kms_key_policy.logs omits the logs.<region>.amazonaws.com service principal, causing CloudWatch Logs encryption to fail. - [correctness] CloudFront standard access logging fails to deliver logs because destination S3 bucket is encrypted with customer-managed SSE-KMS. - [correctness] CloudFront forwarded headers drop required SigV4 headers (x-amz-date, x-amz-security-token) and origin_path alters canonical request URI, breaking IAM authentication. - [performance] aws_api_gateway_rest_api defaults to EDGE endpoint type, creating redundant double-CloudFront latency hops. - [ops] aws_api_gateway_stage allocates a paid cache cluster while CloudFront caching is disabled and requests are per-caller authenticated.grok REQUEST CHANGES
Requirement 1 is unmet: the EDGE REST API is publicly invokable at execute-api, bypassing CloudFront WAF/geo. Req 2/3/5 controls exist on CloudFront only. IAM through CloudFront will 403 without origin signing. Fix with resource policy + origin secret header, then logging/KMS. Effort Medium, confidence high. Top risk: authenticated origin bypass from any country.
Full response, verbatim
**Bottom line:** Do not ship this. Scanners are green because they never read the requirements; requirement 1 is simply not implemented, and the intended CloudFront path cannot succeed with IAM SigV4 as wired. Lock the origin with a REST API resource policy plus a CloudFront origin secret header, and fix origin signing and log delivery before this is treated as meeting the milestone. ## Requirements (Plan Reviewer) **1. NOT SATISFIED.** Missing `aws_api_gateway_rest_api_policy` (and there is no origin `custom_header` on `aws_cloudfront_distribution.this`). `aws_api_gateway_rest_api.this` has no `endpoint_configuration` (defaults to **EDGE**, so the API is itself a public CloudFront-backed hostname). No VPC endpoint, no `disable_execute_api_endpoint`. `outputs.tf` even publishes `execute_api_url`. Bypass path (any client with `execute-api:Invoke`): `GET https://<rest_api_id>.execute-api.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/prod/orders` (SigV4 against that host). That never touches `aws_cloudfront_distribution.this`, so it skips the CloudFront WAF, rate limit, geo whitelist, and viewer TLS policy. Wrong mechanisms present: `aws_api_gateway_client_certificate.this` is **mTLS from API Gateway to its integration**, not CloudFront→API Gateway. Integration is `MOCK`, so the cert does nothing. `aws_wafv2_web_acl.api` + `aws_wafv2_web_acl_association.api` only filter the already-public stage (CKV2_AWS_29 theater); they do not bind callers to CloudFront. Correct binding: REGIONAL API + `aws_api_gateway_rest_api_policy` **Deny** when a secret header is absent/wrong + matching `origin.custom_header` on the distribution. CloudFront prefix-list `aws:SourceIp` alone is not enough (anyone can send traffic from CloudFront). Custom domain / disabling the execute-api endpoint is out of scope, so the default URL **must** stay and must be policy-locked. **2. SATISFIED.** `aws_wafv2_web_acl.edge` (`scope = CLOUDFRONT`, `us-east-1`) has `rate_based_statement` (`limit = 2000`, `IP`) with `action { block {} }`, attached via `aws_cloudfront_distribution.this.web_acl_id`. (The regional API WAF has **no** rate limit; irrelevant to this requirement.) **3. SATISFIED** as a control: `aws_api_gateway_method.get_orders.authorization = "AWS_IAM"`. Unauthenticated calls get 403. Not a working product path: CloudFront does not SigV4-sign origin requests. `forwarded_values.headers = ["Authorization"]` still leaves `Host` as `*.cloudfront.net` on the viewer side and `*.execute-api.*.amazonaws.com` on the origin side, so a mobile-app SigV4 signature will not verify. The path that **does** authenticate is the req-1 bypass. To have both 1 and 3: Lambda-at-Edge / origin-request signing with an origin-access IAM role, **or** a bearer authorizer CloudFront can forward. Do not expect per-caller SigV4 through CloudFront. **4. SATISFIED** as declared resources: API Gateway `access_log_settings` → `aws_cloudwatch_log_group.api` (`retention_in_days = 365`, `kms_key_id = aws_kms_key.logs.arn`); CloudFront `logging_config` → `aws_s3_bucket.logs` (SSE-KMS CMK, lifecycle expire 365). WAF logs similarly 365 + CMK. Functionally fragile (ops/correctness, not a missing requirement resource): see risks below. Delivery/encryption will likely fail on apply even though the plan is valid. **5. SATISFIED** on the edge: `aws_cloudfront_distribution.this.restrictions.geo_restriction` whitelist `PL, NO, SE, DK, DE`. `PriceClass_100` still includes those markets. **Unenforceable** for anyone using the execute-api URL (req 1). No geo control on `aws_api_gateway_stage.prod`. ## Architecture (Architect) Design is internally inconsistent: the front door (CloudFront + WAF + geo) cannot complete IAM auth; the back door (EDGE execute-api) can. Extra scanner-driven surface (regional WAF, client cert, request validator, APIGW cache cluster, second us-east-1 CMK) does not implement the only control that matters for req 1. Intended data path: mobile → CloudFront (TLS, geo, WAF rate limit) → HTTPS origin `{api-id}.execute-api.{region}.amazonaws.com/prod` → IAM method → MOCK. Missing origin-binding and origin-signing, so this path 403s and the public origin path succeeds. ## Attack surface (Security Analyst) - **Origin bypass:** `GET https://<api-id>.execute-api.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/prod/orders` with account IAM creds. Skips rate limit and launch-market geo. Regional WAF default-allow + KnownBadInputs only. - **Internet-reachable EDGE API:** default endpoint type publishes a second global hostname; no resource policy. - **Authz width:** no resource policy means any principal whose identity policy allows `execute-api:Invoke` on this API can call it from any country. - **Cache leak (latent):** stage `caching_enabled = true` / `cache_cluster_enabled = true` with IAM. Default cache key is path+query, not principal. MOCK hides it today; a real order lookup would cross-return responses. - **Log CMK:** `aws_kms_key_policy.logs` is account-root `kms:*` only. CloudWatch Logs and CloudFront log delivery are **service principals**; they cannot use the CMK without key-policy statements. So “encrypted with a CMK” does not hold at runtime. - **CloudFront standard logs:** legacy `logging_config` does not support SSE-KMS and needs ACLs. `BucketOwnerEnforced` disables ACLs → objects never land. Wrong mode for req 4’s encryption bar. - **Client cert / custom header:** none on the CloudFront origin; attackers do not need to forge a shared secret because none is checked. ## Other lenses | Lens | Finding | |---|---| | Correctness | CF default cert + `minimum_protocol_version = TLSv1.2_2021` is not a supported pairing (default cert forces the old CloudFront policy). Missing `aws_api_gateway_account` CloudWatch role → stage access logs often refuse to enable. | | Scope | Regional WAF, client cert, validator, X-Ray, APIGW cache, WAF logging, extra us-east-1 CMK are out of the written reqs (harmless except as false confidence). Custom domain correctly omitted. | | Ambiguity | “No public access” is spelled out as CloudFront-only; IAM is not a substitute. Rate-limit value unspecified (2000 is acceptable). “Access logs” could mean CF, APIGW, or both — they attempted both. | | Performance | CloudFront TTLs are 0 (correct for per-caller auth). EDGE API + extra CloudFront is a double hop. APIGW cache is pointless with MOCK and dangerous with IAM. | | Ops | `execute_api_url` output trains clients onto the bypass. No origin-secret rotation, no alarm on WAF/CF vs APIGW request delta (the metric that would show bypass). | ## Action plan 1. Set the REST API to `REGIONAL`. Add `aws_api_gateway_rest_api_policy` denying invoke unless a high-entropy origin header matches; set that header on the CloudFront origin. **Effort: Short.** 2. Remove `execute_api_url` from outputs (keep only `cloudfront_url`). **Quick.** 3. Stop forwarding client SigV4; sign origin requests with Lambda-at-Edge (or replace IAM with a bearer authorizer the app can send through CloudFront). **Medium.** 4. Drop APIGW cache (or put principal on the cache key). Drop the client certificate. **Quick.** 5. Fix log sinks: allow `logs.<region>.amazonaws.com` (and the us-east-1 twin) on the CMKs; use CloudFront vended/v2 logs if you need SSE-KMS + BucketOwnerEnforced; add `aws_api_gateway_account` for APIGW access logs. **Short.** 6. Keep `aws_wafv2_web_acl.edge` rate limit; add a matching rate limit on the regional ACL as defense in depth, not as a substitute for (1). **Quick.** 7. Revisit if a custom domain is later allowed: then `disable_execute_api_endpoint = true` becomes the stronger origin lock. **Effort:** Medium (1–2d) to make req 1+3 actually true. **Confidence:** high — bypass is the default EDGE execute-api URL with no resource policy; SigV4/Host mismatch is inherent, not speculative. **Escalation:** PRIVATE API + custom origin path only if you later accept that CloudFront cannot be a direct origin without extra network machinery; not needed for this milestone. <SUMMARY> Requirement 1 is unmet: the EDGE REST API is publicly invokable at execute-api, bypassing CloudFront WAF/geo. Req 2/3/5 controls exist on CloudFront only. IAM through CloudFront will 403 without origin signing. Fix with resource policy + origin secret header, then logging/KMS. Effort Medium, confidence high. Top risk: authenticated origin bypass from any country. </SUMMARY> VERDICT: REQUEST_CHANGES - [security] No aws_api_gateway_rest_api_policy (and no CloudFront origin custom header): GET https://<api-id>.execute-api.<region>.amazonaws.com/prod/orders bypasses CloudFront WAF, rate limit, and geo whitelist - [security] IAM SigV4 cannot work through CloudFront as configured (Host mismatch; no origin-request signer); the only working authenticated path is the bypass - [correctness] CMK policies allow only account root; CloudWatch Logs/WAF log delivery cannot use the keys, so req-4 encryption will not function - [correctness] CloudFront legacy logging_config to SSE-KMS + BucketOwnerEnforced will not deliver logs (unsupported encryption and ACLs disabled) - [security] API Gateway cache cluster enabled on an IAM-authenticated GET without principal in the cache key (cross-caller leakage once MOCK is replaced)or:kimi-k3 REQUEST CHANGES
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## Per-requirement review **Req 1 — No public access to the API itself. NOT SATISFIED.** The deciding resource is the one that does not exist: `aws_api_gateway_rest_api_policy`. The API has no `endpoint_configuration`, so it defaults to EDGE, and EDGE/REGIONAL REST APIs are always publicly resolvable at `https://<id>.execute-api.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com`. The concrete bypass: `GET https://<rest_api_id>.execute-api.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/prod/orders` with any valid SigV4 signature returns 200 — CloudFront, the edge WAF rate limit, and the geo whitelist are all skipped. AWS_IAM auth only makes *unsigned* requests fail with 403; it does not route traffic through CloudFront. The client certificate does not close this either: it lets a *backend* verify API Gateway, but the integration is MOCK (nothing verifies anything), and CloudFront never presents the cert to API Gateway. The correct binding resource is an `aws_api_gateway_rest_api_policy` that Denies `execute-api:Invoke` unless the request arrives via CloudFront (e.g., `aws:SourceIp` conditioned on the published CloudFront CIDR set, or a secret-header pattern with a resource-policy/Lambda-authorizer check), or conversion to a PRIVATE API behind a VPC endpoint. `outputs.tf` makes it worse by publishing `execute_api_url`, advertising the bypass path to the very mobile clients the requirement is about. **Req 2 — WAF on CloudFront with rate limit. SATISFIED.** `aws_wafv2_web_acl.edge` (scope CLOUDFRONT, us-east-1) bound via `web_acl_id` on `aws_cloudfront_distribution.this`, with `rate_based_statement` limit 2000/IP at priority 1. Mechanism is correct. Minor note: 2000 req/5min per IP is generous for a mobile order-lookup endpoint, but that is a tuning choice, not a failure. **Req 3 — Requests authenticated. SATISFIED, with a security defect underneath.** `aws_api_gateway_method.get_orders` sets `authorization = "AWS_IAM"`, and CloudFront forwards the `Authorization` header, so SigV4 survives the edge. But see the caching defect below: the stage cache sits *behind* auth and in front of the integration, and its key does not include caller identity — so "authenticated per-caller responses" is not what the system actually delivers. **Req 4 — Access logs, 1 year, CMK. SATISFIED ON PAPER, BROKEN AT RUNTIME.** The declarations are right: API Gateway access logs → `aws_cloudwatch_log_group.api` (365 days, `kms_key_id` = CMK); CloudFront standard logs → S3 with SSE-KMS using `aws_kms_key.logs`, lifecycle expire at 365 days; both WAF log groups 365 days + CMK. The failure is `aws_kms_key_policy.logs`: its single statement grants `kms:*` to the account root principal. That delegates authorization to IAM *identity* policies — but the services that must use the key are *service principals* (`logs.<region>.amazonaws.com` for CloudWatch Logs encryption, `delivery.logs.amazonaws.com` for CloudFront standard-log SSE-KMS writes), and service principals cannot be authorized by identity-based policies. Log group creation with `kms_key_id` succeeds, then log delivery fails with AccessDenied on `GenerateDataKey`. Net effect: **no logs are delivered at all**, which fails the requirement de facto. Fix: add key-policy statements for the logs delivery service principals (scoped with `kms:EncryptionContext` on the log-group ARN / distribution ARN). **Req 5 — PL/NO/SE/DK/DE only. SATISFIED AT THE EDGE, BYPASSABLE.** `geo_restriction` whitelist on the distribution is exactly the five markets. But because Req 1 fails, the direct execute-api path has no geo restriction — the control exists only on the door nobody is forced to use. ## Architecture assessment The shape (CloudFront → API Gateway, WAF at edge, MOCK integration placeholder) is a reasonable milestone skeleton, and the TLS posture (https-only origin, TLSv1.2_2021 viewer cert, redirect-to-https, security headers policy) is fine. Two structural problems: (a) the "only reachable via CloudFront" property — the entire point of the design — was never actually implemented, only described in the API's `description` string; (b) the dead client certificate plus the comment claiming it "lets the origin verify calls came from API Gateway" documents a control that does not exist, which is worse than no comment. ## Attack-surface assessment 1. **Direct-origin bypass (primary).** Signed request to the execute-api URL bypasses: edge WAF rate limiting (so credential-stuffing/enumeration against valid SigV4 creds is unthrottled), geo restriction, and CloudFront logging. The attacker needs valid AWS creds, so this is an authenticated bypass — but requirement 1 exists precisely to shrink that surface. 2. **Cross-caller cache disclosure.** `aws_api_gateway_method_settings.prod` enables `caching_enabled` on `*/*`, and the stage has a cache cluster. API Gateway's default cache key is resource path + declared request parameters — the Authorization header / caller ARN is **not** in the key unless explicitly added. Caller A's `/orders` response can be served to caller B. The team correctly disabled CloudFront caching for exactly this reason ("Authorization is per-caller, so caching is disabled outright") and then re-introduced the same bug one hop deeper. Fix: disable stage caching (`caching_enabled = false`, drop the cache cluster) or add the caller identity to the cache key. 3. **The REGIONAL WAF on the stage does not protect the direct path anyway.** For an EDGE-optimized API, the associated web ACL must live in us-east-1; this one is created with the default provider (eu-west-1), so `aws_wafv2_web_acl_association.api` will be **rejected at apply time** (BadRequestException). Checkov's CKV2_AWS_29 passed because it evaluates the graph (an association resource exists), not AWS's placement rules. So the "scanner's recommendation, applied" is both a guaranteed apply failure and, even if placed correctly, only guards the bypass path rather than eliminating it. ## Other findings - [ops] `logging_level = "ERROR"` on the stage while the requirement is about access logs — fine, but execution logging at ERROR plus a 365-day access log group is the intended split; just confirm nobody expects INFO execution logs for debugging the milestone. - [scope] `aws_api_gateway_client_certificate` and its stage attachment do nothing with a MOCK integration and no verifying backend — remove it or document it as future backend-auth wiring. It currently exists to make the design look like Req 1 is enforced. - [correctness] SigV4 through CloudFront works only if clients sign with the origin host (`execute-api...`) since CloudFront rewrites Host and prepends `/prod` via `origin_path`. This is workable but must be documented for the mobile team, or every client gets 403s. - [ops] Rate limit 2000/IP and PriceClass_100 are sensible for launch markets; no changes needed. VERDICT: REQUEST_CHANGES - [security] Req 1 unmet: no aws_api_gateway_rest_api_policy; SigV4-signed requests to https://<id>.execute-api.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/prod/orders bypass CloudFront, the edge WAF, geo restriction, and CloudFront logging - [security] API Gateway stage cache (caching_enabled on */*) does not key on caller identity, allowing cross-caller disclosure of IAM-authorized responses; the plan disables CloudFront caching for this exact reason and re-introduces it at the origin - [correctness] aws_wafv2_web_acl.api is REGIONAL in eu-west-1 but the API defaults to EDGE endpoint type; AWS requires the ACL in us-east-1 for edge-optimized APIs, so the association fails at apply (checkov passed on graph shape only) - [ops] aws_kms_key_policy.logs grants only account-root; missing statements for logs.<region>.amazonaws.com and delivery.logs.amazonaws.com service principals means CloudWatch and CloudFront log delivery fails with KMS AccessDenied — Req 4 silently broken - [scope] outputs.tf publishes execute_api_url, advertising the direct path Req 1 forbids; aws_api_gateway_client_certificate is unused with the MOCK integration and falsely implies origin verification - [security] Req 5 geo whitelist is only enforced on CloudFront, so the Req 1 bypass also defeats the launch-market restrictionor:glm-5-3 REQUEST CHANGES
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**Bottom line:** The edge stack is well-shaped (CloudFront + CLOUDFRONT-scope WAF with a rate rule + IAM auth + CMK-encrypted logs at 365 days), but Requirement 1 fails at the binding — the execute-api origin is publicly invokable and `outputs.tf` advertises the bypass URL — and Requirement 4 fails in delivery: no bucket policy and no service-principal KMS grants mean the logs that are supposedly "retained for a year" will never be written. There is also a SigV4 host-header correctness bug that will 403 legitimate clients. ## Requirement-by-requirement **1. No public access to the API itself — NOT SATISFIED.** Deciding factor: the *missing* `aws_api_gateway_rest_api_policy` (or any equivalent origin binding). The REST API has no `endpoint_configuration` (defaults to EDGE) and no resource policy, so `GET https://<rest_api_id>.execute-api.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/prod/orders` is invokable from any IP, any country. That path skips the edge WAF rate limit (Req 2), the geo whitelist (Req 5), and the security-headers policy entirely. `outputs.tf` compounds this by publishing `execute_api_url`. The `aws_api_gateway_client_certificate` comment is backwards: a stage client certificate authenticates *API Gateway to an HTTP integration backend*; here the integration is MOCK and it does nothing to verify that traffic came from CloudFront. Correct bindings, either works: - (a) Add `custom_header { name = "X-Origin-Verify", value = <secret> }` to the CloudFront origin block and enforce it with a request-type Lambda authorizer on the method (minimal change), or - (b) Switch to `endpoint_configuration { types = ["PRIVATE"] }` + `aws_api_gateway_vpc_endpoint` + `aws_api_gateway_rest_api_policy` with an `aws:SourceVpce` condition, reached via a CloudFront VPC origin (stronger, more moving parts). **2. CloudFront WAF with a rate limit — SATISFIED.** `aws_wafv2_web_acl.edge` (CLOUDFRONT scope, `rate_based_statement { limit = 2000, aggregate_key_type = "IP" }`) is attached via `aws_cloudfront_distribution.this.web_acl_id`. Caveat: only the *edge* ACL carries the rate rule. The regional WAF on the stage has none, so traffic going direct-to-origin (per Req 1's failure) is completely unthrottled. **3. Requests authenticated (IAM fine) — SATISFIED, with a correctness bug.** `aws_api_gateway_method.get_orders` has `authorization = "AWS_IAM"`; every invoke requires SigV4. But: `forwarded_values.headers = ["Authorization"]` forwards the signature while CloudFront rewrites the `Host` header to the origin's execute-api domain. Host is part of the SigV4 canonical request, so a client that signs for the distribution hostname fails verification and gets 403 at the origin — every legitimate client breaks. Fix: also forward `Host` in the cache behavior's headers, or explicitly document that clients sign against the origin hostname (which further defeats Req 1's intent). **4. Access logs retained a year, encrypted with CMK — NOT SATISFIED (delivery broken; config intent is right).** Retention (365) and CMK wiring are present on `aws_cloudwatch_log_group.api`, `waf_api`, `waf_edge`, and `aws_s3_bucket.logs` (SSE-KMS + 365-day lifecycle). But: - There is **no `aws_s3_bucket_policy`** for `aws_s3_bucket.logs`. CloudFront standard-log delivery requires a bucket policy granting the CloudFront delivery principal `s3:PutObject` on the prefix; with `BucketOwnerEnforced` and no policy, nothing is ever written. - `aws_kms_key_policy.logs` (and its us-east-1 twin) grants only account-root `kms:*`. CloudWatch Logs CMK encryption requires the key policy to allow `logs.<region>.amazonaws.com` (`kms:Encrypt*`, `Decrypt*`, `ReEncrypt*`, `GenerateDataKey*`, `DescribeKey`); without it, `PutLogEvents` for the API access log and both WAF log groups fails. Similarly, CloudFront delivery into an SSE-KMS bucket needs `kms:GenerateDataKey` granted to the delivery principal. Net effect: zero access logs anywhere, so "retained for a year" is vacuously true and forensics are blind. **5. Launch markets only — SATISFIED (CloudFront path only).** `aws_cloudfront_distribution.this` → `restrictions.geo_restriction { whitelist ["PL","NO","SE","DK","DE"] }`. Undermined by Req 1: the direct execute-api URL has no geo restriction at all. (`PriceClass_100` covers Europe — consistent with the markets, fine.) ## Architecture assessment The overall design is sound: TLS 1.2 minimum, HTTPS redirect, managed security headers, IPv6, WAF with managed known-bad-inputs rule plus rate limiting, per-callership caching disabled at the edge. Two design notes: - **The regional WAF on the stage is scope creep with a tooling rationale** — it exists solely to satisfy CKV2_AWS_29, duplicates the log4j managed rule, and lacks the one control (rate limit) that would matter for direct-origin traffic. Keep it only as a deliberate defense-in-depth decision, not because a scanner asked. - **The API Gateway stage cache is a cross-user leakage risk.** `cache_cluster_enabled = true` plus `caching_enabled = true` with the Authorization header not in `cacheKeyParameters` means one caller's cached `GET /orders?orderId=X` response can be served to a different caller with valid IAM credentials. Since the edge TTLs are all 0 anyway, disable the stage cache. ## Attack surface Primary exposure: an attacker with a valid client credential (mobile apps embed SigV4 material routinely) invokes the origin directly — no rate limit, no geo restriction, only IAM auth and the regional log4j rule in the way. Secondary: the cross-user cache leak above. Tertiary: broken log delivery means no evidence trail after an incident, which quietly defeats the *purpose* of Req 4 even if the plumbing is fixed later. VERDICT: REQUEST_CHANGES - [security] Req 1: execute-api origin publicly invokable (rate limit and geo whitelist bypassable); add an origin binding — custom origin header + Lambda authorizer, or PRIVATE endpoint + VPC origin + aws_api_gateway_rest_api_policy with aws:SourceVpce; drop the execute_api_url output. - [correctness] SigV4 Host mismatch: Authorization forwarded but Host rewritten to the origin domain means legit clients 403; forward Host or specify the signing host. - [ops] Req 4: no aws_s3_bucket_policy granting CloudFront delivery s3:PutObject, and KMS key policies missing the CloudWatch Logs service principal → zero logs are written despite 365-day/CMK configuration. - [security] Stage cache enabled with IAM auth and Authorization absent from the cache key → cross-user response leakage; disable the stage cache (edge TTLs are already 0) or add cacheKeyParameters. - [correctness] Client certificate comment misdescribes its direction; it verifies API Gateway to a backend, not CloudFront to API Gateway — dead config here (MOCK integration), misleading to future maintainers. - [scope] Regional WAF association added solely to satisfy Checkov CKV2_AWS_29; duplicate rule coverage, no rate rule — adopt or drop as an explicit defense-in-depth decision, not tooling appeasement.
Rulings not recorded. The host agent ruled on this round, but its individual rulings and reasons were not kept. What survives is its verdict, REJECT, and the count of critical issues it accepted, 21.
Why the round closed this way. codex, gemini, grok, openrouter:kimi-k3, openrouter:glm-5-3 voted REQUEST_CHANGES. The host ruled REJECT and accepted 21 critical issues (engine debug log); the individual rulings were not recovered. The host revised the plan again and recorded a blind verdict on it, but the next dispatch_peers call came after the 20-minute wall budget, so the engine ended the run unresolved before any reviewer saw that revision.
Outcome
UNRESOLVED after 1 round(s)