Implementation mode (core capability)
Implementation mode (core capability)
Not a shipped surface. This section documents what
coreis capable of, not what the running server exposes. No call site in the live composition root (server/mcp/index.js) passesallowImplement, so the shipped MCP server is read-only end to end - see Key Design Decision #3 (external). Today the only user-facing write path is the standalone gemini bridge'ssandbox: "workspace-write"opt-in.
The core codex + gemini providers can run workspace-write (edit files) instead
of the default read-only. The capability is gated by two AND-ed locks - a write
happens only when both are true:
- Construction lock -
makeCodexProvider({ allowImplement: true })/makeAntigravityProvider({ bridge, allowImplement: true }). Absent/false, the provider is read-only no matter what the request says.capabilities.canImplementreflects this lock, sopanel/discovery report honestly per process. - Request lock -
DelegationRequest.mode, a closed"advisory"|"implement"enum (default"advisory"). Only the exact string"implement"requests a write.
effectiveImplement = (opts.allowImplement === true) && (req.mode === "implement")Read-only is the structural default at every layer: anything that is not exactly that
pair runs advisory. The request vocabulary is mode-level (advisory/implement); the
OS sandbox string (workspace-write) is computed inside the provider and never taken
from caller input, so a request cannot smuggle argv.
Flag mapping (only when effectiveImplement):
| Provider | Advisory (default) | Implement |
|---|---|---|
| Codex | codex exec --sandbox read-only |
codex exec --sandbox workspace-write (never danger-full-access/bypass-approvals) |
| Gemini | buildAgyArgs({sandbox:"read-only"}) + runGemini(..., {readOnly:true}) |
buildAgyArgs({sandbox:"workspace-write"}) (-> --dangerously-skip-permissions) + runGemini(..., {readOnly:false}) |
Codex enforces the sandbox at the OS level (Seatbelt/Landlock/seccomp) in both modes.
For Gemini, readOnly:false drops the OS write-deny wrapper (intended - writes must
land), but the credential env scrub runs in both modes: advisoryEnv() still strips
*_KEY/*_TOKEN/*_SECRET-shaped vars plus GIT_ASKPASS/SSH_AUTH_SOCK from the
child env, so a write run edits the worktree yet never receives the operator's keys or
SSH agent - the human commits and pushes, not agy. See the
Gemini read-only enforcement detail above for the shared scrub.
Scope. This is the section-1 core capability, proven by tests
(test/core-codex.test.js, test/core-antigravity.test.js). The live composition root
(server/mcp/index.js) does not pass allowImplement:true, so the running unified
server stays read-only and no end-user tool sets mode:"implement" yet. The unified
implement tool (no readOnlyHint, so the host prompts a human), the never-cache
guarantee for write runs, a forced audit/session record, and multi-turn for impl land
with the MCP consolidation. Hosted/remote builds (HTTP-only providers, no codex/gemini
CLIs) are inert by construction - they never set the construction lock.